unresponsiveness makes more bureaucracy. Two years ago, the Council of Representatives--APA's supreme legislative body whose decisions affect the future direction of psychology--adopted a rule requesting that agenda items in their final form be provided three weeks prior to its meeting. This past year, the Council expanded the rule to define what it meant by final form. Clearly, a segment of the management team repeatedly failed to respond to informal entreaties from the Council (read customers) and to the first rule.
Resolution should have happened at the informal stage by using management tools such as performance appraisal. Every action of the management team should contribute to busting, not fueling, bureaucracy. (Perhaps rules spawned by management's unresponsiveness should be named after the offender!)
A deeper echo from this case is the indifferent attitude of the management team toward the Council and its work. Consider the hoops the Council had to go through simply, and I repeat simply, to get in a timely manner the basic information it needs to make the best decisions it can. Meeting that need would seem to be an administrative no-brainer.
Organized psychology claims the banner of the scientist-practitioner model; uses the phrase "scientific research results show that... " to catch the ear of members of Congress; has rules requiring that public policy positions should be backed by scientific data; and has a dedicated cadre of volunteers to review, massage, and deliberate on policy direction. Yet, the Council of Representatives passed the resolution on prescription privileges that undifferentiates psychology in the marketplace--a crossroad--without walking its talk. Organized psychology must live its values and its structures; otherwise its center is lost.
Finally, I was thunderstruck to read that 8.4% of the 1995 budget went to consultants. Corporations, from large to small, typically allocate no more than 1% of their budget to consultants. The membership deserves a detailed accounting of that $5 million. APA's top leadership is paid a substantially higher salary than the CEO of a Fortune 500 company. APA's members should expect some equivalence in the allocation of their resources.
REFERENCES
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In using deception, the investigators in this study (Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen) were in good company. In a recent comment, Taylor and Shepperd (August 1996) reminded us of Adair, Dushenko, and Lindsay's (1985) finding, also in the American Psychologist, that"upwards of 81% of studies published in the top social psychological journals use deception in their procedures" (as cited in Taylor & Shepperd, 1996, p. 886) . Taylor and Shepperd then described an experiment in which they used deception to study the effectiveness of conventional debriefing procedures for detecting suspicion of deception among research participants. Notwithstanding the explicit instructions of the experimenter not to communicate while he or she left the room on a pretext, they found that participants did communicate with each other. By doing so, participants found out that deception was involved in the experiment--a discovery that they did not reveal during debriefing. Taylor and Shepperd (1996) concluded that our observation suggests that participants may fail to supply, and may even withhold, information that is crucial to evaluating whether the procedures provide a valid test of the hypothesis. If participants cannot be counted on to divulge such information on their own, then researchers need to take additional precautions to assess participant suspicions and perceptions. (p. 887)
We believe that it is time to go beyond cosmetic refinements of experimental procedures and address the fundamental question of whether deception should be an acceptable option at all. We propose it should not be.
Experimenters in psychological research typically conceptualize participants as cooperative (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991) . In addition, researchers assume that participants think of experimenters as living up to the cooperation principle that requires them to provide useful and truthful information (Hilton, 1995) . To the extent that participants have reason to believe that they will be deceived--a blatant violation of the cooperation principle--they are likely to turn noncooperative. The strategic interaction between experimenters and participants has, after all, the incentive structure of prisoners' dilemma games. Participants can choose not to cooperate, and so can experimenters. Theoretically and experimentally, we know that in repeated prisoners' dilemma games, persistent noncooperation of identifiable defectors is likely to lead to the unraveling of the Paretooptimal equilibrium in which both the experimenter and participant choose the cooperative action (see Frank, 1988; Ortmann & Colander, 1997) .
The purpose of this comment is not to single out specific studies. We are concerned about how deception compromises the reputation of all psychological experimenters among potential participants. Sensational media reports and publications inside and outside of psychology are all potential sources of information about standard procedures in psychology for future participants and might create and reinforce participants' expectation that they will be deceived. Psychological laboratories are likely to be affected by reputational spillover effects as a consequence. Such effects could transform every interaction between an experimenter and a participant into a repeated game.
Let us recall the ethical standards regarding deception established by the American Psychological Association:
Methodological requirements of a study may make the use of concealment or deception necessary. Before conducting such a study, the investigator has a special responsibility to (1) determine whether the use of such techniques is justified by the study's prospective scientific, educational, or applied value; (2) determine whether alternative procedures are available that do not use concealment or deception; and (3) ensure that the participants are provided with sufficient explanation as soon as possible. (as cited in Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, pp. 240-241) These guidelines make it clear that investigators should undertake a thorough costbenefit analysis before using deception. Although this policy prescription is fine theoretically, as a practical matter it leaves the assessment of (private) benefits and (public) costs to an interested party (the experimenter)--a classic moral hazard problem. Economic agency theory as well as the psychological theory of self-serving biases predict a breakdown in self-monitoring in this case. Indeed, given the overwhelming use of deception in psychology experiments and its dramatic increase since the early 1960s (Adair et al., 1985 , reported that only 16% of the empirical studies in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology used deception in 1961), we conclude that self-monitoring among psychological researchers with regard to the costs and benefits of deception has broken down, despite exhortations to "use it [deception] only when clearly justified, not as a matter of course" (Kelman, 1967, p. 1) .
We believe that the dramatic increase in the use of deception may invalidate the claim that deception is ever defensible. Put simply, the costs of reputational spillover effects for the profession may be too high. (Ironically, the well-intentioned Guideline 3 may have contributed to the problem.) Elsewhere, we argue (Hertwig & Ortmann, 1997) that the breakdown in self-monitoring may contribute critically to the high variability and frequent nonreplicability of research results and ultimately affect the reputation of the profession.
Our proposition that the profession ought to consider outlawing all forms of deception is not as radical as it may sound. In experimental economics, for example, professional conventions categorically prohibit deception for exactly the reputational reasons laid out above. As cognitive, evolutionary, and social psychology ventures more and more into domains formerly inhabited solely by economists, reevaluating the use of deception in psychological research becomes ever more important.
